February 21, 2003
The Martial Plan
By
PAUL KRUGMAN
he Marshall Plan was America's finest
hour. After World War I, the victors did what victors usually do: they
demanded reparations from the vanquished. But after World War II
America did something unprecedented: it provided huge amounts of aid,
helping both its allies and its defeated enemies rebuild.
It wasn't selfless altruism, of course; it was farsighted, enlightened
self-interest. America's leaders understood that fostering prosperity,
stability and democracy was as important as building military might in
the struggle against Communism.
But one suspects that our current leaders would have jeered at this
exercise in "nation-building." And they are certainly following a very
different strategy today.
It's not that the Bush administration is always stingy. In fact, right
now it is offering handouts right and left. Most notably, it has
offered the Turkish government $26 billion in grants and loans if it
ignores popular opposition and supports the war.
Some observers also point out that the administration has turned the
regular foreign aid budget into a tool of war diplomacy. Small
countries that currently have seats on the U.N. Security Council have
suddenly received favorable treatment for aid requests, in an obvious
attempt to influence their votes. Cynics say that the "coalition of the
willing" President Bush spoke of turns out to be a "coalition of the
bought off" instead.
But it's clear that the generosity will end as soon as Baghdad falls.
After all, look at our behavior in Afghanistan. In the beginning, money
was no object; victory over the Taliban was as much a matter of bribes
to warlords as it was of Special Forces and smart bombs. But President
Bush promised that our interest wouldn't end once the war was won; this
time we wouldn't forget about Afghanistan, we would stay to help rebuild
the country and secure the peace. So how much money for Afghan
reconstruction did the administration put in its 2004 budget?
None. The Bush team forgot about it. Embarrassed Congressional staff
members had to write in $300 million to cover the lapse. You can see why
the Turks, in addition to demanding even more money, want guarantees in
writing. Administration officials are insulted when the Turks say that
a personal assurance from Mr. Bush isn't enough. But the Turks know
what happened in Afghanistan, and they also know that fine words about
support for New York City, the firefighters and so on didn't translate
into actual money once the cameras stopped rolling.
And Iraq will receive the same treatment. On Tuesday Ari Fleischer
declared that Iraq could pay for its own reconstruction — even though
experts warn that it may be years before the country's oil fields are
producing at potential. Off the record, some officials have even
described Iraqi oil as the "spoils of war."
So there you have it. This administration does martial plans, not
Marshall Plans: billions for offense, not one cent for reconstruction.
Of course, postwar reconstruction in Europe and Japan wasn't just a
matter of money; America can also be proud of the way it built
democratic institutions. Alas, the Bush administration's postwar
political plans are even more alarming than its economic nonchalance.
Turkey has reportedly been offered the right to occupy much of Iraqi
Kurdistan. Yes, that's right: as we move to liberate the Iraqis, our
first step may be to deliver people who have been effectively
independent since 1991 into the hands of a hated foreign overlord. Moral
clarity!
Meanwhile, outraged Iraqi exiles report that there won't be any
equivalent of postwar de-Nazification, in which accomplices of the
defeated regime were purged from public life. Instead the Bush
administration intends to preserve most of the current regime: Saddam
Hussein and a few top officials will be replaced with Americans, but
the rest will stay. You don't have to be an Iraq expert to realize that
many very nasty people will therefore remain in power — more moral
clarity! — and that the U.S. will in effect take responsibility for
maintaining the rule of the Sunni minority over the Shiite majority.
If this all sounds incredibly callous and shortsighted, that's because
it is. But then what did you expect? This administration doesn't worry
about long-term consequences — just look at its fiscal policy. It wants
its war; there's not the slightest indication that it's interested in
the boring, expensive task of building a just and lasting peace.
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