| w w w . h a a r e t z d a i l y . c o m |
 |
|
|
'Security in two months - but not for settlements'Last Thursday, still ensconced in his small office in the Fatah's External Affairs Department in Ramallah, Interior Minister Dr. Hani el Hassan was surrounded by the top commanders of the Palestinian security services in the West Bank - Haj Ismail, commander of the National Security forces; Zuheir Mansara, commander of the Preventive Security services; and Ribhi Arafat, head of the Security Coordination mechanism.The appointment with Hassan had been made a few days before Yasser Arafat in a surprise announcement named Hassan interior minister. According to "the reforms" this means Hassan is supposed to become supreme commander of all the security services. Hassan said the American envoy, William Burns, was due any minute and he apologized politely that he had to end the conversation. He also emphasized that it was a conversation, not an interview. He had decided that until the new cabinet is approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council he shouldn't be giving interviews. The PLC was meant to meet yesterday but by evening it was still not clear if it would be able to do so, since Israel was preventing 13 of its 80 members from attending. Abu Ala, the PLC Speaker said that without all members of the PLC being allowed to attend, it would not meet. The 65-year-old Hassan's connection to security matters tightened over the last six months while he served as the engine, on behalf of Fatah and the Tanzim, of the initiative to cease attacks on Israeli civilians - an initiative that was shelved temporarily in the wake of the assassination of Salah Shehadeh, which cost the lives of 11 Gazan children. Last month, after the Hamas settled its accounts for that IDF attack with some retaliatory terrorist attacks - Hassan released the declaration and ordered his people to turn the intifada into a movement of civil disobedience. He says the Fatah leadership opposes terror, and not only because it is immoral to kill civilians. Terror, he says, harms any revolutionary force that claims moral superiority over its oppressor. But his distinctions about morality when it comes to attacking civilians takes a turn when it comes to settlers. Hassan says the settlers cannot be considered civilians - they are in the wrong place, they are armed, the army uses them, and they kill Palestinians. He asks if people living on another people's land can be considered civilians immune from attack. Besides, he adds, who kills more civilians, the Palestinians or the IDF? Since when do you spare civilian lives? Hassan doesn't understand why Israelis were surprised by the latest Tanzim leaflets calling for revenge after the "accidental" assassination of Muhamed Abiath. You have to understand what happens after such an incident. Ten thousand people, nearly the entire village, took part in the funeral. If you keep killing Palestinians the terror attacks will continue, he said. There won't be a financing problem. The money comes from outside the territories. And he warns the trouble will come from the south, from Gaza. No fence, he says, can hold back 1.2 million hungry people seeking food for their children. He says he wants Israel to give the Palestinians credit for being intelligent enough to understand that the military conflict with the IDF does not serve their interests. Nonetheless, he hopes Israelis understand that despite the IDF's strength, the military, like the occupation, won't provide them with the security they so long for. He says security needs a partner. Security and occupation don't go together. He knows many Israelis wonder if the end of the occupation will bring the security Israelis want so much. He promises that within two months he'll bring absolute security back to Israel - on two conditions. The first condition is that the IDF withdraws from Areas A and B. He points to Haj Ismail, and says that handing over security control in Hebron to his men is nothing but a farce. What can be expected from policemen who are not allowed to wear uniforms, let alone carry weapons, and while the IDF still controls Abu Sneina? The second condition is renewal of the political process. Hassan does not believe security can be returned without a political horizon. He says that if those two conditions are met, it will be possible to quickly establish a joint coordination mechanism with the U.S., and international help, including Arab countries. No partner The security troubles began in the 1980s, says Hassan, when Israel nurtured Hamas. He quotes Yitzhak Rabin, then defense minister, as saying that the policy was meant to undermine the PLO. And sure enough, the Hamas grew. According to Hassan, Arafat needed time to take control of the situation. Hassan asks rhetorically why there was a steady decline in the number of attacks against Israelis from the middle of 1996 to the beginning of 2000 - and he answers, because Arafat could control things then. He remembers after one major attack, Arafat sat ashamed in his office and didn't know what to do. Suddenly, the phone rang. It was Rabin on the line. He invited Arafat to meet with him at Erez, where the next day they worked on ways to fight terror. The lesson from that is clear to Hassan, but he has no hopes from the current government, particularly in the political sphere. He says Israelis have many partners for peace in the Palestinian leadership, but the Palestinian leadership doesn't have a single partner in the government. The right wing is always looking for ways to escape from the peace process and is leading to a dead end, he says. But it's a delusion to believe that if the Israelis humiliate the Palestinians, the Palestinians will agree to live in that dead end, throw out Arafat, accept the military government, and make do with some limited autonomy leaving the security in Israeli hands. Hassan complains that in Israel, and the West in general, Arafat in particular, and the Palestinians in general are regarded simplistically. He said that while Arafat is considered a symbol of the Palestinian struggle for freedom, Arafat cannot decide everything on his own. Fatah made a decision to maintain unity in every situation, and despite all the disputes, the majority rules in the movement. At Camp David everyone could see that Arafat could not make a decision against the majority opinion, said Hassan. Last month, Arafat, for the first time, presented his cabinet to the Central Committee. According to Hassan, the Fatah leadership went over each name and threw out nine out of 19. Hassan said he believes that Arafat has begun to internalize the matter of democratic processes. The twisted relationship between the political level and the security mechanisms, which came together after the Oslo agreement and deepened during the intifada, are not to Hassan's liking. In front of the heads of the security services in his office he vowed he would change the odd arrangement in which security forces reach into civilian institutions, including youth movements. He shares the criticism in Israel and Washington of Israeli and American politicians who nurtured Palestinian security officials because they believed the security commanders could straighten things out. Once, he recalls, he was invited to speak to a meeting of AIPAC leaders. Someone told him that two weeks earlier they had hosted "`the great leader Jibril Rajoub,'" former head of Preventive Security in the West Bank. Hassan, who has always been a civilian in the Fatah movement, says he stood up and explaining who he was, declared that he was a much greater leader than Rajoub. Half joking, he says that like Arafat, he should send flowers of gratitude to Ariel Sharon. The siege of the Muqata imprisoned him in one room with Arafat and totally obstructed the appointment of Abu Mazen as prime minister. Although he was one of those in the Fatah leadership who decided to impose Abu Mazen as prime minister, on Arafat, he himself didn't have the chance of becoming a minister in a PA cabinet - until the siege forced him to spend weeks with Arafat. Since the siege, says the soon-to-be minister, the Palestinian street doesn't want to hear about a single scratch on Arafat's stature. Hassan met last week with a group of Palestinian intellectuals, including Dr. Khalil Shkaki, the public opinion pollster, and asked them what would happen if Arafat were to disappear the next morning. He asked them to raise any patriotic and logical solution. He went home empty handed. He said that Sharon and all the others who want to get rid of Arafat are in effect trying to get rid of the Palestinian establishment. Today it's Arafat, tomorrow Abu Mazen, and the day after Hani el Hassan, he said. Devilish details Hassan was not part of the Oslo crowd, indeed he proudly states he was opposed to Abu Mazen and Abu Ala. He says he warned Arafat against staged procedures which, says Hassan, would ruin the process. He says he told Arafat if the Israelis demand something from you, give them one and a half of it and go home with a state. He doesn't understand the Israeli position on the refugee issue. If you don't want to end the conflict, the problem of right of return can be postponed, he said. But anyone who wants to end the conflict must be interested in an agreement that solves the refugee problem, as well. The refugee problem is not merely a Palestinian problem, it's an Arab problem. That's why the Arab League statement in Beirut (the Saudi initiative) is so important. He suggests paying attention to the word "agreed" in that statement, which means Israel would have a veto over any arrangement not to its liking. He is disturbed that while talk of "transfer" mounts in Israel, Israelis expect the Palestinians to moderate their talk about the right of return. He knows that a few days ago the Knesset voted down a bill that would have prevented pro-transfer parties from running for office. When you people are talking about expelling the residents of Umm el Fahm, don't be surprised that we're suspicious about your intentions, he says. By Akiva
Eldar
|
|
|