Aron's Israel Peace Weblog

Introspection as a Prerequisite for Peace
The New York Times

September 7, 2002

Introspection as a Prerequisite for Peace

By YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI

With a response

By ARON SHTULL-TRAURING

YKH

J ERUSALEM— On this Rosh Hashana, a time of self-examination, I confess that my capacity as an Israeli for self-criticism has been exhausted.

AST This is very obvious from what follows.

YKH

The terrorist war that began around Rosh Hashana two years ago...

AST

One sentence in and Halevi is already obfuscating. Did a "terrorist war" really begin two years ago? Here's a little refresher for all those who like to prove their points by conveniently rebuilding the past. First, there is a relatively objective analysis of the situation in the Mitchel Plan of April, 2001. The key conclusion:

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.

In other words, this was not a planned response of the PA to force Israel's hand after Camp David. It was a spontaneous result of frustration with Oslo on the Palestinian street.

Moreover, in the first few months of the Intifada, casualties were mostly on the Palestinian side. It was only after months of brutality by the Israeli army, especially subsequent to Arik Sharon becoming Prime Minister, that the Hamas and Islamic Jihad initiated their suicide terror campaign. Graphic reminder can be found here.

YKH

...and provoked official campaigns of Jew-hatred throughout the Arab world...

AST

Another blatant lie. What official campaign of Jew hatred? I challenge YKH to name one Arab country that has initiated an official anti-Jewish campaign, let alone anti-Israel campaign? The irony is that during this Intifada, while the official Israeli policy has been to demonize all Palestinians (and implicitly all Arabs) as terrorists, all Arabs as crudely anti-Jewish, and to negate the possibility of a negotiated settlement, the Arab world as a whole has consistently called for the end of violence and for a return to negotiations and a just settlement. In fact, the whole official Arab world has officially endorsed the Saudi-Arabian peace initiative through the Beirut Declaration of March, 2002.

YKH
...has convinced Israelis like me who are ready to make far-reaching compromises for peace that there will be no acceptance of a Jewish state in the Middle East no matter how much territory we concede.

AST

Since the premise is false the conclusion is meaningless. If YKH truly is willing make far-reaching compromises, he should be urging his government to pursue the Clinton Plan, the Mitchell Plan, the Beirut Declaration, UN Security Council Resolution 1397 and the most recent EU initiative, all of which have been accepted by the Palestinians as a basis for negotiations. Instead, he, and the majority of Israelis, support brutal violence against millions of innocent Palestinian civilians, all in the name of the "war on terrorism." It is any wonder that the Palestinians are convinced that YKH and his ilk are more interested in ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the West Bank and not reconciliation?

YKH

Once I was prepared to reach different conclusions. During the first intifada that began in the late 1980's, I served as a reservist in Gaza's refugee camps. For one month a year I became an occupier, entering family bedrooms in the middle of the night to arrest suspects for crimes ranging from terrorism to failure to pay taxes.

AST

Now YKH lets us know how sensitive and caring he is. He is deeply touched by his experience of being an occupier "once a month." Of course, what he conveniently forgets to note is that for the Palestinians the occupation isn't a once a month stint in the reserves. Its 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks out of very year since 1967. And from their perspective the injustice and loss began long before that in 1948.

YKH

That experience taught me that both sides share ample rights and wrongs. I was hardly alone. The first intifada reduced to a minority those hardliners who believed that only the Jewish people had legitimate claims to the land. The majority of us learned to accommodate a competing narrative.

AST

Is this really the case? The fact is that except for a very brief period immediately after the signing of the Oslo accords, their never was a majority in the Israeli parliament that supported the process. And certainly, only a very small minority of Israelis ever were willing to accommodate a competing narrative. Israelis wanted out of the West Bank and Gaza because the first Intifada proved to them that the occupation was a burden. They wanted to get rid of the Palestinian nuisance, not address the just grievances of the Palestinian people.

YKH

We neutralized our attachment to the biblical territories and accepted the inevitability of uprooting most of the West Bank settlements. 

AST

Did we indeed? During every Israeli government subsequent to Rabin's assassination, the investment in the settlements grew, not diminished. Under the great "left-wing" leader Barak, the population of the settlements doubled. If indeed we planned to uproot the settlements, why did we continue to invest so heavily in their growth and expansion?

YKH

We offered to share our most precious possession, Jerusalem, with our bitter enemy, Yasir Arafat

AST

Oh really? First of all, while it may be true that Barak put the issue of Jerusalem on the table at Camp David, when he went there he did not have a Parliamentary majority behind him. The issue of Jerusalem was never put to the test in Israel. In fact, it is likely that Barak would not have succeeded in getting parliamentary support for a compromise on Jerusalem. Moreover, the very way he phrases this sentence shows that YKH has never, in fact, "accommodated a competing narrative." From the Palestinian perspective, Jerusalem has been under Islamic control from the days of Muhammad, except for the brief and bloody period of the Crusaders. In their eyes, the fact that the Arab world is willing to share Jerusalem, one of their most precious possessions, with their bitter enemy, is a huge act of generosity. Unlike Israel, the Arab world in the Beirut declaration has now officially declared their willingness to do so. The current Israeli government's position is that Jerusalem will never be shared.

YKH

For me, that process of examination meant undertaking a journey into Islam and Christianity. As a religious Jew, I went on pilgrimages to mosques and holy places, seeking to experience something of the devotional life of my neighbors. I joined the Muslim prayer line and learned the power of its choreographed surrender. I prayed in a refugee camp that I had once patrolled as a soldier.

AST

How sensitive Mr. Halevi is.

YKH

In turn, I sought from Palestinians an acknowledgment that I wasn't a crusader or a colonialist but an exiled son returning home. I waited for Palestinian leaders to tell their people what the late Yitzhak Rabin told us: that we must withdraw from our exclusive claim to the land. Those words never came.

AST

He obviously wasn't listening very carefully. The vast majority of the Palestinian leadership endorsed the Oslo process and worked hard to convince the Palestinian street of its validity. Marwan Barghouti is seen as a leading candidate to succeed Arafat, and is now being tried in Israeli courts for "murder" charges related to his activities as the head of the Tanzim organization. He was one of those who strongly worked for the success of Oslo. Even as late as January of this year,in this article, Barghouti says:

The only way for Israelis to have security is, quite simply, to end the
35-year-old Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. Israelis must abandon
the myth that it is possible to have peace and occupation at the same time,
that peaceful coexistence is possible between slave and master. The lack
of Israeli security is born of the lack of Palestinian freedom. Israel will
have security only after the end of occupation, not before.

Once Israel and the rest of the world understand this fundamental truth, the way
forward becomes clear: End the occupation, allow the Palestinians to live
in freedom and let the independent and equal neighbors of Israel and Palestine
negotiate a peaceful future with close economic and cultural ties.

Let us not forget, we Palestinians have recognized Israel on 78 percent of historic
Palestine. It is Israel that refuses to acknowledge Palestine's right to
exist on the remaining 22 percent of land occupied in 1967. And yet it is
the Palestinians who are accused of not compromising and of missing opportunities.
Frankly, we are tired of always taking the blame for Israeli intransigence
when all we are seeking is the implementation of international law.


I don't hear Barghouti making an exclusive claim to the land, nor denying Israel's legitimate rights. Quite the contrary.

No, Barghouti and the Palestinians never became Zionists. They still look at Israelis as colonialists. And the historic reality is that Israelis are. Whether we like to admit or not, the land belonged to the Arabs when the Jewish settlers first came at the turn of the century. And no matter how legitimate the goals and aspirations of the Zionist movement might have been, the fact is that the Zionists did not work very hard at taking into consideration the legitimate rights of the local population. YKH might argue that the Palestinians should have been more generous and accommodating when Jewish refugees sought a refuge in Palestine before and after the war. But the fact is that the rest of the world wasn't very generous and accommodating either. And the Palestinians ended up paying the price for the European war against the Jews, even though they were not responsible. Despite this, as Barghouti points out they and the whole Arab world are willing to recognize Israel's borders within 78% of historic Palestine. They only ask that they be allowed to live in freedom and dignity in a small piece of the original Palestine.

YKH

Few Palestinians seem prepared even now to examine their own share of responsibility for the conflict. Instead, most remain barricaded in a self-righteous understanding of history, apportioning all innocence to themselves and all blame to us.

AST

In fact, this article just proves that YKH and most Israelis are guilty of what Freud calls " projection." Substitute "Israeli" for "Palestinian" and vice versa in the above sentence, and you are far closer to the truth.

YKH

Perhaps their inability to acknowledge the historical complexity of this conflict is understandable: The Palestinians, after all, were its losers. Yet that failure led them to commit their greatest blunder in a history of missed opportunities.

AST

Again, YKH continues to barricade himself in the long-discredited narrative that it is the Palestinians, and not the Israelis, who have a long history of missed opportunities. And of course, he reveals his arrogance here: the Palestinians have to accept Israel's dictates because they are the "losers."

YKH

By declaring war two years ago against an Israeli government that was as far left as any in history, they turned Israelis like me from supporters of Ehud Barak into supporters of Ariel Sharon.

AST

We already addressed the issue of the Palestinians "declaring war" above. As for the myth of Ehud Barak being "far left" and the implicit appeal to the myth of his "generous offer," see this and this.


YKH

What the first intifada was for Israelis, this intifada should be for Palestinians: a precious moment of self-examination. The Oslo process failed because of an asymmetry of self-criticism: Only one side came to the realization that this is a conflict between two legitimate national movements.

AST
The Barghouti quote above, and myriads like it, and of course the Beirut declaration, belies the validity of this statement by YKH that the Palestinians are to blame for the failure of Oslo. The Palestinians for their part claim that the Oslo process failed precisely because those like YKH who claimed to support it, simultaneously continued the growth and expansion of the settlements and the occupation, thereby showing by their actions that they were not really interested in redressing the wrongs done to the Palestinians by 35 years of occupation in the West Bank, much less the wrongs done by the establishment of the state of Israel.

YKH
The time has come for Palestinians to partition their sense of historical justice. They need to admit that much of their suffering, especially now, has been self-inflicted. And they need to confront the repeated moral failures of their leaders, from supporting Nazi Germany to backing Saddam Hussein.

Yet so far, there are few signs of moral unease. An ad placed earlier this summer by Palestinian intellectuals urging an end to suicide bombings because they are ineffective isn't good enough. Few Palestinians have challenged the historical revisionism now increasingly prevalent in Arab culture that denies the ancient roots of Jews in this land, the existence of the gas chambers and even Arab involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks.

AST

And the Palestinians would say that the time has come for those Israelis who truly treasure the values of tolerance, democracy and justice to partition their sense of historical justice, and recognize the deep hurt the establishment of the State of Israel caused the Palestinian people.

Isaac Deutscher was a Jewish historian who had lost much of his family in the Holocaust. He was a committed leftist, and was interviewed for the New Left Review in 1967. Here is what he had to say:

A man once jumped from the top floor of a burning house in which many members of his family had already perished. He managed to save his life; but as he was falling to the ground, he hit a person standing down below, and broke that person's legs and arms. The jumping man had no choice; yet to the man with the broken limbs, he was the cause of his misfortune.

If both behaved rationally, they would not become enemies. The man who escaped from the blazing house, having recovered, would have tried to help and console the other sufferer; and the latter might have realized that he was the victim of circumstances over which neither of them had control.

But look what happens when these people behave irrationally. The injured man blames the other for his misery and swears to make him pay for it. The other one, afraid of the crippled man's revenge, insults him, kicks him, and beats him up whenever they meet. The kicked man again swears revenge and is again punched and punished. The bitter enmity, so whimsical at first, hardens and comes to overshadow the whole existence of both men and to poison their minds...

A rational relationship between Israeli and Arabs might have been possible if Israel had at least attempted to establish it, if the man who jumped from the burning house [i.e. the Jews after the holocaust] had tried to make friends with the innocent victim of his descent and compensate him. This did not happen. Israel never even recognized the Arab grievance. From the outset, Zionism worked towards the creation of a purely Jewish state and was glad to rid the country of its Arab inhabitants. No Israeli government has ever seriously looked for any opportunity to assuage the grievance...

The Germans have summed up their own bitter experience in the phrase "Man kann sich totsiegen!" 'You can rush victoriously into your grave.' This is what the Israelis have been doing. In the conquered territories and Israel there are now a million and a half Arabs, well over 40% of the total population. Will the Israelis expel this mass of Arabs in order to hold 'securely' the conquered lands?...

Yes, this victory is worse for Israel than a defeat. Far from giving Israel a higher degree of security, it has rendered it much more insecure.

These words, written over 35 years ago, sound prophetic today. Yet so far, the moral obtuseness and short sightedness of the Israeli leadership and people, grows ever day.

YKH

In my journey into Palestinian Islam, I encountered the profound Muslim ability to live daily life with a constant awareness of mortality — an awareness that can create humility, a prerequisite for reconciliation between enemies. Peace will come only through mutual introspection and atonement. Many Israelis went far in trying to understand Palestinian claims and grievances. To resume that necessary process among Israelis now requires a self-critical moral dialogue among Palestinians.

AST

The arrogance of this conclusion is breath taking. The morally superior tone, the total lack of humility and introspection on Halevi's part, is symptomatic of Israeli society as a whole. Truly Israel is rushing victoriously to its grave, with people like Halevi leading the way.

Yossi Klein Halevi, Israel correspondent of The New Republic, is the author of "At the Entrance to the Garden of Eden: A Jew's Search for Hope with Christians and Muslims in the Holy Land."

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The Mitchell Plan, April 30, 2001 -

WHAT HAPPENED?


We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Most of the information we received came from the parties and, understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.

In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September 2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes of violence.

In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit.(3) Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be an internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.

Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200."(4) According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured.(5)

Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days.(6) Thus began what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount).

The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse."(7) In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."(8)

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was planned. It claims, however, that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations,"(9) and that "the failure of the summit, and the attempts to allocate blame on the Palestinian side only added to the tension on the ground..."(10)

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception.

From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.

What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions and responses. There have been exchanges of fire between built-up areas, sniping incidents and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have also been terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterized by the GOI as counter-terrorism), including killings, further destruction of property and economic measures. Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian areas.

From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterize the current crisis as "an armed conflict short of war"(11) is simply a means "to justify its assassination policy, its collective punishment policy, and its use of lethal force."(12) From the Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used, and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic tools."(13)

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.