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A local initiative that went international Since the Israeli Air Force bombing in Gaza two weeks ago, the number of terror victims has continued to grow, and with them the number of questions. Would it have been possible to prevent the loss of life of all, or some, of them? Was there a genuine chance for a cease-fire? Is there indeed someone with whom to talk about how to put an end to the grief, suffering and despair? The political leaders and top military brass stubbornly claim that the answer to all these questions is a decisive no. They say all the talk about a cease-fire that was being formulated on the eve of the bombing are a repetition of the drivel produced by the Palestine-Europe friendship association. Last week, this column reported that Shin Bet security service head Avi Dichter told the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the entire cease-fire story was a local initiative from an outlying village near Salfit, north of Ramallah. Committee Chairman MK Haim Ramon (Labor) has promised that the sub-committee on secret services will not make do with this version and will fully pursue the matter. Here are a few new facts contributing to the debate over the significance of the cease-fire move among the upper echelons of Fatah. Sub-committee members should ask themselves whether it is possible that these facts (gleaned from conversations with senior western diplomats who followed the move closely) were unknown to the heads of the Shin Bet and Military Intelligence before the Gaza attack. If they did know, is it possible that they did not report them to the political level? And if they did report them, for whom are they now covering up? Contrary to various reports, the cease-fire move was not merely a Palestinian initiative supported by the European Union. Representatives of the Quartet (the U.S., EU, UN and Russia) who convened in London on July 2, heard a detailed report from the head of the EU security team in the territories, Alistair Crooke, about his latest contacts with Fatah and Tanzim leaders. Crooke appraised those present - among them U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns - of a new political initiative by the young Palestinian leadership that would include a unilateral cessation of fire against Israeli civilians and gaining control of the regime in the territories by democratic means. The American administration was aware of the fact that Crooke was helping Hussein a-Sheikh and his Fatah colleagues to proceed with the move and did not oppose it. EU peace envoy Miguel Moratinos briefed EU ambassadors in Israel and sent them a draft of the cease-fire announcement. Moratinos stressed that Washington had given its blessing to the initiative. Would the United States and the EU have lent a hand to an insignificant local initiative? Attorney Jawad Boulous kept his client, Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti (who is imprisoned in Israel), abreast of developments and received permission from Barghouti to announce his support for the move. Barghouti read the Fatah statement that was due to be published in Arabic, Hebrew and English, and even considered affixing his signature to it. The U.S. and EU were aware of the content of the meetings that took place in an Israeli jail. Is it possible that the Shin Bet did not know this? There is evidence that Washington knew of, and did not object to, Crooke's meeting with Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin to discuss the possibility of the organization's joining the cease-fire. Is it possible that the Shin Bet and military intelligence did not know? Or is a meeting of this kind also considered a local initiative? Two days before the Gaza attack, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer asked the Prime Minister's Office whether it was aware of the contacts for a cease-fire and received a negative response. Two days after the Gaza attack, Kurtzer protested that the prime minister had not given the Palestinians sufficient leeway to complete the move. He received a two-part answer: first, Israeli intelligence had checked with its sources and found no evidence that the move was serious; and second, his first call had come too late to stop the assassination of Salah Shehadeh. Despite the blow of the Gaza bombing, Barghouti and his associates told the Europeans that they were committed to a cease-fire. Boulous is currently trying to garner international support in Europe to have Barghouti freed so that he can lead a non-violent struggle against the Israeli occupation. By Akiva Eldar